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FILLING EMPTY SEATS: HOW STATUS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL HIERARCHIES AFFECT EXPLORATION
VERSUS EXPLOITATION IN TEAM DESIGN
FABRIZIO PERRETTI
GIACOMO NEGRO
Bocconi University
Informal and formal mechanisms affect choices between exploitation and exploration
in team design. We argue that the status differentiation of team members and differ-
ences in organizational structure limit exploration in the form of introducing newcom-
ers to teams and creating new combinations of team members. High- and low-status
team members and one- and three-layer organizational structures were expected to be
positively related to exploration, and middle-status team members and two-layer
structures were expected to be negatively related to it. We used data on 6,446 motion
pictures produced by the Hollywood film industry in the period 1929–58 to test our
hypotheses.
Fifteen years ago, March (1991) developed a
theory about how organizational knowledge and
learning influence the balance in organizations
between strategies of exploration and exploita-
tion. One organizational feature suggested as af-
fecting this balance is the difference between ex-
perienced and inexperienced personnel. March
argued that “old-timers,” who are more familiar
with the knowledge already reflected in their
organization, tend to produce exploitation, and
newcomers, who are more likely to contribute
new knowledge, increase exploration. The in-
creasing reliance on teams in organizations (An-
cona & Caldwell, 1992) raises the question as to
whether this type of heterogeneity also affects the
exploration versus exploitation trade-off at the
team level and hence informs how teams should
best be composed.
Deciding whom to put on a project or a team is
one of the biggest challenges facing a manager or
team leader (Reagans, Zuckerman, & McEvily,
2004), and mixing and matching newcomers with
old-timers to form new configurations are impor-
tant decisions in designing teams (Chen, 2005).
Such decisions are particularly relevant in tempo-
rary settings (e.g., research groups, airline crews,
medical teams), where members are regularly cy-
cled and recycled, moving frequently into new
teams within or between organizations (Arthur,
1994; Hackman, 2002). The distinction between
newcomers and old-timers has been recognized by
the extant literature on teams as an important di-
mension of heterogeneity (Jackson, Stone, & Al-
varez, 1993). However, most of this literature stud-
ies the effects of team heterogeneity on various
outcomes, assuming team composition as exoge-
nous (Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Williams & O’Reilly,
1998). We suggest, instead, that team composition
is itself the outcome of two processes, a team-level
and an organization-level process, in which team
members and the organizational structures respon-
sible for team outcomes can influence or control
member selection.
This study not only investigates the effects of
these two processes on team composition but also
extends March’s perspective by suggesting that
the exploration-exploitation balance can provide
a lens through which team composition can be
analyzed. We focus on two dimensions of team
composition: (1) newness of members, and (2)
newness of member combinations. In each di-
mension, the greater the extent of newness, the
greater the implied extent of exploration. The
established Weberian definition of status and
power (Lenski, 1966; Weber, 1953) as distinct
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sources of social stratification—whereby hierar-
chies of positions result in unequal access to
goods and services and thereby affect one per-
son’s control over another’s behavior—is a basis
for our analysis. We consider how rankings based
on (1) an informal process of status differentia-
tion between team members and (2) a formal pro-
cess dependent on different organizational struc-
tures influence the employment of newcomers
and the use of new combinations of team mem-
bers. Our study suggests that both processes af-
fect the trade-off between exploration and exploi-
tation. Particularly, the processes show a
U-shaped relationship with exploration, inhibit-
ing and then fostering newness in team
composition.
We tested our hypotheses in the context of the
Hollywood film industry from 1929 to 1958,
which seemed a particularly appropriate setting
for our study. No one person in the entire motion
picture field knows for certain what’s going to
work. Movies are thus a high-risk group endeavor
in which high-status members usually represent
a hedge against disaster and ensure against empty
seats at film theatres. Hollywood has always been
a “caste-system where big stars didn’t pal around
with unknowns, but if even studio giants
couldn’t guess the biggest star in their business,
the territory is thus a bit murkier than expected”
(Goldman, 1984: 13). As a result, films are tem-
porary team-based projects in which managers
constantly mix and match artistic and technical
members in the hope of increasing the chances of
producing hits (Caves, 2000).
What makes the film industry particularly in-
triguing is that markets and careers intersect, and
a dual matching process between film projects
and their participants takes place (Faulkner &
Anderson, 1987). Careers are produced by
projects (and their controllers) distinguishing
among candidates by applying tests of reliability,
performance, and accountability. At the same
time, candidates distinguish among projects and
evaluate their potential of fulfilling their de-
mands and career aspirations. In addition, in the
time frame analyzed here, the U.S. film industry
employed different systems of production and
management, seeking an optimal balance be-
tween the industry’s need to deliver relatively
standard products and the creative imperative of
producing novel products (Caves, 2000). This
study investigates how these two elements—the
matching process and the organizational design
process—affect team composition.
THEORY
Designing Teams: The Influence of Members’
Diversity
A team can be regarded as an open and complex
system made up of a set of members who perform
specific functions and interact through a coordina-
tion network with one another, as well as with the
larger social context in which the team is embed-
ded (McGrath, Arrow, & Berdahl, 2000). Our focus
is on task-related teams, which are groups whose
task requires team members to work together to
produce something for which they are collectively
accountable and whose acceptability is potentially
assessable (Hackman, 2002).
Team design relates to the specification of team
size, membership, and staffing; the definition of a
team’s tasks and members’ roles; and the creation
of organizational support for the team (Guzzo &
Dickson, 1996). As part of team design, team com-
position (who is on a team) is a frequently studied
variable and refers to configurations of attributes,
either of team members or subgroups within a
team. Team composition usually involves (1) a se-
lection process, in which an organization invites
potential members to be part of a new or existing
team and (2) a reciprocal evaluation process, in
which potential candidates screen existing mem-
bers and other potential candidates to decide
whether to join the team (Ilgen, Hollenbeck, John-
son, & Jundt, 2005). In both cases, the expectation
of performance levels plays a major role. Potential
members of task-focused groups base performance
expectations on the multiplicative production rela-
tionship, also known as the “O-ring theory of pro-
duction” (Kremer, 1993), according to which every
member of a team must perform at or above some
threshold level of proficiency. Team members are
aware that below-threshold performance by a sin-
gle member can dramatically endanger whole-team
performance, and thus candidates and existing
members develop performance-level expectations
for each other, and for themselves.
Previous studies have shown how performance
expectations are based on existing or potential team
members’ observable set of attributes and charac-
teristics (Ridgeway & Berger, 1986; Webster & Hy-
som, 1998). Such attributes can include gender,
ethnicity, age, education, culture, style, experience,
and functional expertise (Jackson et al., 1993; Wil-
liams & O’Reilly, 1998). The attribute we investi-
gate is newness of team members, and we focus on
“newness to industry” rather than “newness to
firm” or “newness to team.” As we explain in detail
in the methods section, this dimension captures the
elemental exploration versus exploitation trade-off.
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We discriminate as a first approximation between
newcomers and old-timers. Researchers have not
only argued that the two categories are distinct, but
also that inexperienced and experienced members
have different interpretations of organizational re-
ality and use different “sense-making” processes
(Jones, 1986). Empirical evidence shows that the
distinction between newcomer and old-timer mat-
ters at both the team and the organization level and
is relevant for organizational socialization, group
interactions, and group effectiveness (Moreland &
Levine, 1989; Morrison, 2002).
Newcomers are important because they may set
the stage for innovation. The additional elements of
ingenuity and improvisation they can bring can
yield fresh perspective for a team and a novel in-
terpretation of the problems the team faces, thus
generating creative solutions. However, organiza-
tions have little or no prior knowledge about how
newcomers will perform and interact with other
members (Chen, 2005). In entering unfamiliar or-
ganizational settings, newcomers may experience a
reality shock or a sense of surprise that has been
likened to the experience of entering a new and
foreign culture (Jones, 1986; Louis, 1980). Like
those entering a foreign culture, newcomers incur a
“liability of foreignness” and thus incur the risks of
high information search costs, stereotyping, and
marginalization by old-timers (Jackson et al., 1993).
By comparison, old-timers’ performance and
compatibility with other members have already
been tested in other teams. Old-timers are more
socialized because they have had more time to ob-
serve, accept, and adopt predominant norms and
values. However, they also represent the major
source of inertial behavior, rigidity, and resistance
to new solutions (Rollag, 2004). According to
March (1991) old-timers know more, but what they
know is redundant as their knowledge is already
reflected in the “organizational code,” (i.e., the
rules and forms of an organization) and they are
less likely to contribute new knowledge. On the
other hand, although newcomers are less knowl-
edgeable than the individuals they replace, what
they know is less redundant with the organization-
al code, and they are more likely to deviate from it.
Newcomers stay deviant long enough for the code
to learn from them.
Teams are not mere collections of people but
configurations of social actors joined to one another
by basic ties (McGrath et al., 2000). This social
perspective shifts the focus of team composition
from choosing from a given set of members to
choosing from a set of interdependent combina-
tions. In creating a new team, organizations not
only select between newcomers and old-timers but
also choose: (1) to keep using old-timers, replicat-
ing combinations already used in prior teams, (2) to
keep using old-timers, but in new combinations
with other old-timers, or (3) to introduce newcom-
ers in the configuration and thus create new com-
binations among newcomers and/or between new-
comers and old-timers.
Accordingly, team composition concerns not
only mixing but also matching newcomers and old-
timers. Mixing involves balancing the advantages
of recombining old-timers used in previous
teams—thus exploiting the knowledge and wisdom
gained from prior team experience—with the ad-
vantages of introducing newcomers without prior
experience who can be later reused in other team
configurations, thus allowing the exploration (and
future exploitation) of more creative solutions.
Matching involves having old-timers be part of old
combinations or form new combinations, either
with other old-timers or with newcomers. Old com-
binations, which are already familiar and routin-
ized, can speed up task execution, but old-timers
who have lost interest in remaining together or
experienced interpersonal tensions may resist them
(Ilgen et al., 2005). New combinations offer novel
prospects and a sense of excitement and opportu-
nity but require mutual trusting. Team members
must feel that their team is competent enough to
accomplish the task and will not harm their indi-
vidual interests. Untested combinations can more
easily lead to communication difficulties, discrim-
ination, and conflict (Jackson & Joshi, 2004).
Team configurations are options exercised from a
set of possible choices: if something goes wrong, it
may prove difficult to use the same configuration in
other projects. Team composition is thus the out-
come of a search process that takes place within a
constrained set of solutions and is both cause and
consequence of the balance between exploration
and exploitation, and between heterogeneity and
homogeneity.
Team-Level Constraints: The Influence of
Members’ Status
Social status is an important dimension of mem-
ber heterogeneity. Status is defined as position
within a social structure that confers rights, pres-
tige, or honor upon an individual according to var-
ious ascribed and achieved criteria (Parsons, 1970).
Status not only relates to the position of an indi-
vidual but can also be an attribute of a group that,
within its larger social environment, has success-
fully claimed a specific honor and thus enjoys cer-
tain privileges (Parsons, 1953).
Status-organizing processes are based on any
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characteristic of social actors around which evalu-
ations of or beliefs about them come to be organized
(Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). Our study
focused on the measurement of status as social
prestige (Wegener, 1992). Prestige is the esteem,
respect, or approval granted by an individual or a
collective for performance or qualities they con-
sider above the average. Formal prizes and awards
issued through competitive public procedures cre-
ate status, which can be measured by the number or
range of such accolades an individual or a group
receives (Goode, 1978). This allocation of prestige
depends to a large extent on significance of the
audiences (i.e., customers, peers, and critics) who
assign such formal prizes.
The allocation of prestige produces a hierarchy
based on a particular type of performance or qual-
ity, and such rankings affect one social actor’s abil-
ity to control another’s behavior. From the social
exchange perspective, prestige is a commodity that
can be exchanged but is subject to asymmetrical
exchange processes in which benefits received can-
not be reciprocated (Blau, 1964). For instance, so-
cial actors with low status benefit from associating
with high-status actors more than they benefit from
affiliation with other low-status actors and will
seek to enter esteemed groups and share in their
prestige (Goode, 1978). On the other hand, high-
status actors aim at preserving their position, and
thus tend to avoid their lower-status counterparts,
generally restricting their range of possible partners
to those with whom they have had prior interac-
tions (Podolny, 1994).
In contexts characterized by uncertainty and risk,
distinct evaluations by external audiences sustain
status hierarchies (Podolny, 1993) and lead to the
emergence of status-based “homophily” (McPher-
son, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001), which influences
the range of possible interactions among team
members. According to this perspective, status-
based homophily will hinder successful collabora-
tion in teams that contain both high- and low-status
members, especially if the teams include newcom-
ers. However, sociological research on status also
points out that social conformity is highest in the
middle of a status hierarchy and lower at the top
and the bottom. Phillips and Zuckerman (2001)
reestablished the middle-status conformity theory
with empirical evidence. According to this view,
members with high or low status are much more at
liberty to depart from accepted norms than those in
the middle without violating audiences’ role expec-
tations. They are more willing to deviate from ex-
perienced sets of behavior, to accept higher search
risks, and to engage in random exploration of more
distant portions of the creative space. These argu-
ments suggest that organizations composing teams
can combine high-status team members with low-
status members such as newcomers with few con-
straints and that middle-status members will be the
most difficult to successfully mix and match with
others. Hence:
Hypothesis 1. In teams, member status will
have a U-shaped relationship with the extent
to which team design is characterized by ex-
ploratory features such as (a) newness of team
members and (b) newness of combinations of
team members.
Organization-Level Constraints: The Influence of
Hierarchy
Teams do not exist in isolation from the overall
structure of the organization in which they are set
(McGrath, 1991). On the contrary, teams interact
systematically with the organizations in which
they are nested in many ways, including negotiat-
ing delivery deadlines, coordinating or synchroniz-
ing work flow with other lateral functional groups,
mapping resources, and obtaining support from up-
per levels of management (Ancona, 1990). Because
of such interaction, the general design of an organ-
ization can affect the design of a team. Among the
features of organizational design, hierarchy is one
of the most pervasive, consisting of structures in
which individuals are arranged in a cascade of
authority and communication relations (March,
1994).
According to Thompson (1967), organizations
tend to localize tasks and confine them to the
smallest possible inclusive units, such as crews or
teams. Control of such teams is typically organized
via one of three general hierarchical structures. In a
simple “one-layer structure,” top management has
full responsibility and direct control over projects
and resources located in different crews or teams.
But as the numbers or sizes of project groups in-
crease, top managers can no longer be realistically
involved in the progress of all the initiatives being
pursued. To increase efficiency, organizations tend
to develop a “two-layer structure”: the higher layer
is responsible for deciding which projects the firm
implements; the lower layer, positioned at the team
level, is assigned project control and is responsible
for implementing the projects.
However, there may be strong interdependencies
between an organization’s different projects. Al-
though a two-layer structure may be efficient for
actually controlling projects, it may be less able to
coordinate interdependent elements. This limita-
tion may lead organizations to “develop liaison
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positions linking the several groups and the rule-
making agency” (Thompson 1967: 61) by introduc-
ing a middle hierarchical layer, “which is not sim-
ply higher than the one below, but . . . is a more
inclusive clustering, or combination of interdepen-
dent groups, to handle those aspects of coordina-
tion which are beyond the scope of any of its com-
ponents” (Thompson, 1967: 59). The organization
and management of project groups is now via a
“three-layer structure.”
We focus our analysis of team design on three
scenarios: (1) one-layer structures, in which the
CEO of a firm (who is both top manager and also the
project manager for all teams) is responsible for
designing the different teams; (2) two-layer struc-
tures, in which the CEO oversees the various
projects and the project managers control the de-
sign of their teams; and (3) three-layer structures, in
which a layer of middle managers exists between
the CEO and the project managers and team design
is the joint responsibility of project managers and
these liaison middle managers.
All projects involve risk that their managers will
seek to avoid (March & Shapira, 1987). One-layer
structures, in which a central manager is able to
spread his or her risk over different projects, sup-
port exploratory behavior. However, as projects’
number, size, or complexity increases, it becomes
more difficult for one individual to manage them
efficiently. As a result, a two-layer structure may
develop in which responsibility for the various
projects is assigned to different managers. By being
focused on single projects, managers are able to
foster efficiency but cannot take advantage (or
avoid the problems) of cross-project interdepen-
dencies or spread their risk over a portfolio of
projects. For instance, project managers may be
unable to access resources until other projects are
completed or face the risk of being subject to budget
or schedule deviations beyond their control
(Wilemon & Cicero, 1970). To contain these higher
project risks, project managers rely on acquired
experience and past sets of behavior and, rather
than coping with the added risk of using newcom-
ers or new combinations, which involve testing and
integration costs and can induce performance or
schedule deviations, project managers will prefer
employing combinations of experienced team
members. Thus, two-layer structures move the bal-
ance in favor of exploitation at the expense of
exploration.
With the introduction of middle liaison manag-
ers, who are able to account for interdependencies
in their risk perspectives, a three-layer structure
can readjust the balance toward exploration. A se-
ries of studies (see Ancona, 1990; Floyd & Wool-
dridge, 1997; Tushman, 1977) has documented
how middle managers mediate between an organi-
zation’sinstitutional(strategic)andtechnical(opera-
tional) levels. Burgelman (2002) described the in-
novatory role of middle managers in the strategic
change that transformed Intel from a memory com-
pany to one emphasizing microprocessors. The in-
troduction of a middle hierarchical layer enhances
coordination between interdependent projects and
fosters exploratory behavior, increasing the
chances of employing newcomers and new combi-
nations at the team level. Therefore, we suggest that
exploration in team design will be highest in one
and three-layer structures and lowest in two-layer
structures; hence:
Hypothesis 2. Hierarchical layers in organiza-
tional structures will have a U-shaped relation-
ship with the extent to which team design is
characterized by exploratory features such as
(a) newness of team members and (b) newness
of combinations of team members.
METHODS
Background for Empirical Setting
The relevance of status. Decades ago, Rosten
characterized Hollywood as a community of film-
makers “engaged in an endless search for defer-
ence, from the world, their colleagues, themselves”
and busy in a long “effort to win respect from
symbolic juries” (1941: 44). Audience evaluations
in turn affect the perceptions and behavior of rele-
vant social actors: rankings suggest what films
moviegoers should see, and producers use person-
nel rankings when deciding how to develop their
projects, judging that some inputs (primarily actors
and directors) enjoy higher visibility and thus rep-
resent assets that will increase the projects’ likeli-
hood of success or that can be used as vehicles for
product differentiation. Thus, choices of team com-
position are biased toward highly valued directors,
well-established and bankable actresses and actors,
and successful technical personnel (Faulkner &
Anderson, 1987). As a result, rankings influence
the careers of artistic and technical personnel, as
individuals associated with successful films build
reputations that help them gain subsequent film
contracts.
Film actors and directors can achieve high-status
ranks when the judgments of multiple audiences
converge. These people are the stars, the “demi-
gods and demi-goddesses in the forefront of public
attention” (Rosten, 1941: 9). As there is a shared
recognition that such positions are available to only
a few people, high-status actors gain not only pres-
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tige and admiration (Goode, 1978) but also a confi-
dence in their social acceptance that allows them to
deviate from conventional behavior. Producers can
deploy high-status personnel to promote novel so-
lutions while incurring only small risk. The out-
come is similar for low-status personnel. Since
there is no consolidated judgment from audiences,
they may enjoy a higher degree of freedom in their
choices. On the contrary, personnel occupying in-
termediate-status positions might see themselves at
risk of falling in audience rankings and are more
unlikely to deviate from established expectations.
The impact of organizational structures. Holly-
wood’s production practices have historically been
driven by a constant tension: “a movement toward
standardizing the product for efficient economical
mass production and a simultaneous movement
toward differentiating the product as the firms bid
competitively for a consumer’s disposable income”
(Bordwell, Staiger, & Thompson, 1985: 88). To try
to meet these simultaneous but conflicting de-
mands, studios have adopted different modes of
production and hierarchical systems of manage-
ment control.
In the late 1920s, Hollywood operated under the
so-called central producer system, a one-layer or-
ganizational structure whereby studio heads were
responsible for coordinating the entire annual pro-
duction of each firm, which might amount to 30 to
50 films a year. In the early 1930s many production
executives were of the opinion that such factory
methods could no longer be applied successfully to
the creative aspects of film production (Lewis,
1933). Studios then introduced alternative organi-
zational structures that aimed at retaining the ad-
vantages of large-scale operations yet encouraged
individual effort in the creative phases of picture
production.
One solution was the “producer-unit” system, a
two-layer organizational structure in which indi-
vidual (unit) producers took on responsibility for
the complete production process for an individual
film. According to this system, “each producer
would be allowed to proceed with his assignment
unmolested by company supervision. The pro-
ducer would select a cast in accordance with his
own ideas. He likewise could choose a director and
all other personnel needed to produce his particu-
lar film” (Lewis, 1933: 100).
A second solution was a three-layer organization-
al structure that involved a unit producer together
with a middle-level manager, often an experienced
ex-department head, as associate producer (Bord-
well et al., 1985). The associate producer was “a
new studio official to be placed in authority over
writers, players, directors and others employed in
each film-making unit, his duty being the coordi-
nation of all departments with the two-fold inten-
tion of insuring high quality and eliminating
waste” (Hampton, 1931: 316). The alternative or-
ganizational designs did not completely replace the
central producer system. Rather, studios now had
different options, and they employed whichever
management structures they found most advanta-
geous (Bordwell et al., 1985).
Sample and Data Collection
For our study, we collected and analyzed data on
all 6,918 feature films produced from 1929 to 1958
by the seven largest U.S. motion picture industry
producers (the “majors”: Columbia Pictures, MGM,
Paramount, RKO, 20th Century Fox, Universal, and
Warner Brothers). Our sample focused on fictional
feature films, the main type of motion picture pro-
duced and released by the majors, and excludes
animation, documentaries, newsreels, and short
films, because their production and distribution
required different sets of resources and capabilities,
creative as well as technical (Jones, 2001). We also
eliminated silent movies, which by 1930 were a
minor and rapidly declining product type in the
industry (Balio, 1993). In order to analyze team
composition without focusing on any underlying
architectural variation, we started our observation
period in 1929, when the majors had completed
their transition to sound (Crafton, 1999). We ended
our analysis in 1958, the year RKO terminated pro-
duction before disbanding, and following the com-
pletion of the reorganization induced by the 1948
antitrust intervention (the last theater divestitures
took place in 1956–57) and competition from tele-
vision led to a drastic decline in the number of
feature films produced and released by the majors.
1 The following history is exemplary. In 1957, after
starring in The Man Who Knew Too Much—one of Para-
mount’s biggest hits, directed by top-level director Alfred
Hitchcock and costarring top performer Doris Day—
James Stewart (an Oscar winner in 1941, a four-time
Oscar nominee, winner of the New York Film Critics
award in 1939, and top box office star in both 1954 and
1956), accepted the leading role in Night Passage, an
offbeat western movie. The film was directed by James
Neilson, a TV-series director in his first movie experi-
ence, and costarred Audie Murphy, who had never been
awarded a prize and had never appeared in a hit film. But
the choice didn’t damage Stewart’s career: he went on to
star in Vertigo (1958) and then played the leading role in
Anatomy of a Murder (1959), for which he received an
Oscar nomination and won the New York Film Critics
Award.
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Our primary data source was the American Film
Institute Catalog of Motion Pictures (AFI), a decade-
by-decade encyclopedic publication that provides
product-level information on all motion pictures
released in the United States between 1893 and
1970 using a single compiling methodology (Jones,
2001; Mezias & Mezias, 2000). Where this catalog’s
records were incomplete (from 1951 onwards), we
relied on Fetrow’s (1999) and Nash and Ross’s
(1985) filmographies. All information was then
checked with the federal Motion Picture Catalog of
the Library of Congress 1950–1959, a government
publication that records films receiving copyright
protection along with production entities and
copyright dates. Because there were occasional
gaps in information from these sources, our final
sample comprised the 6,446 features for which we
had complete details.
Measures
Dependent variables. We analyzed teams’ ex-
ploratory features by defining two variables that
directly describe (1) the presence of newcomers
and (2) new combinations of team members. We
operationalized the two variables by creating a
newcomers index and a new combinations index,
ordinal representations of an unmeasured continu-
ous variable (McKelvey & Zavoina, 1975; Winship
& Mare, 1984). Both indexes were based on the five
most important creative and technical personnel
categories in film production: the director, the two
leading actors in their screen credit order, the edi-
tor, and the director of photography (cinematogra-
pher). Within a film’s artistic team, the lead actors
and the director are the most visible resources in
the basic package presented to top management for
“green-lighting” and to investors who may provide
financing. They are crucial for differentiation and
signaling purposes. Within the technical team for a
film, we selected the two functions that make the
most general contributions to the structural design
and quality of realization of the product (Bordwell
et al., 1985).
The first index, newcomers, was a count of the
number of newcomers included in a film and
ranged from 0 to 5. Higher values of the index
implied higher exploration. To avoid inflation in
the first years of observation, we considered indi-
viduals as new if they had not been employed in
the industry before 1926. A newcomer was thus
defined as an individual who was new to the in-
dustry and not as new to a firm, to team work, or to
other members of the organization because we in-
tended to capture the risk-taking and search dimen-
sions of explorative action. March argued that ex-
ploration depends on gaining new information to
improve future returns rather than on using cur-
rently available information to improve present re-
turns (1991: 72). If we had focused on newness to a
firm, for example, we would have treated as explo-
ration choices made using existing information
about personnel who had worked for competitors;
such choices would, however, indicate exploita-
tion more than exploration.
The second index, new combinations, scored dy-
adic combinations according to the level of new-
ness each one involved. Of the dyads resulting from
our selection of five key creative categories, we
chose director–actor 1, director–actor 2, actor 1–ac-
tor 2, director-editor, and director-cinematographer
for computing our second index. Figure 1 illus-
trates these combinations. For each film in the sam-
ple, we calculated the number of dyads involving
new and previously employed personnel. We then
2 Some inputs, like screenwriters, were excluded from
the analysis by design. Scripts can be developed before
assembly of a team begins, and usually screenwriters do
not intervene in the selection of key team members like
actors or directors. Moreover, writers often employ non-
original materials for their scripts. The original authors
may be credited as writers, but in fact they have no role
in the project; for example, films based on Shakespeare’s
plays may credit Shakespeare as writer. In these cases,
data would become unreliable or be missing.
3 For example, Public Enemy (produced in 1931 by
Warner Bros.) starred two new lead actors, James Cagney
and Jean Harlow, together with three people with previ-
ous experience: the director William A. Wellman, the
editor Edward M. McDermott, and the cinematographer
Dev Jennings. The newcomers index value for the film
was therefore 2.
FIGURE 1
Dyads Included in the Measurement of the New
Combinations Index
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attributed the resulting scores to the film. As with
the previous index, we considered a combination
to be new if it had never been employed in the
industry before 1926.
The new combinations index was calculated as a
composite of three submeasures: (1) c1, which was
the proportion of dyads containing at least one new
resource, (2) c2, which was the proportion of dyads
presenting new combinations of old resources, and
(3) c3, which was the proportion of dyads that were
old combinations of old resources. After applying a
weight of 1 to c1, 0 to c2, and 1 to c3, we
computed an average value that ranged from 1 to
1 with 0.2 intervals. The rationale for the weight-
ing scheme was that under resource scarcity, a
trade-off between exploration (c1) and exploitation
(c3) occurs. Moreover, combining existing knowl-
edge to generate new combinations (c2) constitutes
neither pure exploration nor pure exploitation (Ka-
tila & Ahuja, 2002). Higher values of this index
indicate higher exploration.
We focused our analysis on dyads because they
represent the essential unit of social interaction,
the basis for more complex forms (Simmel, 1902),
and provide the ideal locus for studying homophily
(McPherson et al., 2001). Film production involves
two distinct, core subteams—the artistic and the
technical—with the director working across them
as the sole coordinating figure (Goldman, 1984;
Kawin, 1987). The set of dyads considered here was
chosen to provide a meaningful representation of
the film production process and also to limit the
likelihood of observing links as an artifact of ran-
dom association patterns when there was no direct
interaction between actors and editors or
cinematographers.
Silver’s ethnographic work (1975) analyzed how
the director of a movie functions as the mediator in
the teams’ interaction patterns. Silver observed that
technicians did not even talk to the actors during
shooting: “They spoke to the assistant director who
then spoke to the director who then spoke to the
actors” (1975: 87). And a principal actor explained:
“Everything revolved around him. As it should.
Every function on a film—whether actor, editor,
cameraman, or writer—should work through the
director” (Silver, 1975: 77).
Independent variables. A composite index of
variables measured the status conferred by three
external audiences on individuals. The individual
variables used for the composite index status were
(1) director status, (2) lead actor 1 status, and (3)
lead actor 2 status. To account for prestige con-
ferred by one or multiple audiences—peers, the
market, and critics—we coded the variables on a
1–4 scale as follows: 1, “no recognition of high
status by any of the three audiences”; 2, “recogni-
tion by one of the three”; 3, “recognition by two of
the three”; and 4, “recognition by all three.” We
then multiplied the three measures to create a sin-
gle composite measure of status in which higher
values meant higher status. The multiplicative
function underlined the growing disparity in op-
portunities and rewards that emerges from status
differentiation (Merton, 1973). We used the qua-
dratic term of the index (status squared) to test for
a curvilinear relationship between status and
newness.
The first dimension used to calculate the status
index was peer recognition through formal prizes,
which act both as awards for individual perfor-
mance and as public announcements that convey
information about status. Because of their news
value, prizes have considerable effects on actors’
choices and careers (Goode, 1978) and become a
source of actor differentiation that perpetuates
stratification in social structures. The most influen-
tial award in the film industry is the Academy of
Motion Picture Arts and Sciences Award—the Os-
car—and its major effects are increases in prestige,
salary, and the power to negotiate the roles and
employment of costars. These effects are long-last-
ing; in fact, they tend to be permanent (Levy, 1987).
For peer recognition, we assigned scores based on
personnel having won Oscars, using data from
Shale (1993).
The second status dimension was market recog-
nition. In the film industry, box office results are
the most visible indicator of success. Players fea-
tured in box office hits achieve the label “stars,”
and, in this uncertain industry, producers believe
that hiring them will systematically improve their
chances of differentiating their products and
achieving or repeating success. The result is that
stars gain access to more and better job opportuni-
ties, command higher salaries, and exercise power
by influencing the production process (Caves,
2000). To measure market recognition, we collected
data from rankings of actors and directors based on
box-office results published by the leading trade
publication Motion Picture Herald since 1932. For
years before 1932, we integrated the list of players
starring in the five top-grossing films with data
4 In the case of Public Enemy, the score for the index
was 0.4, calculated as follows: director–actor 1  0.2
(Cagney was a newcomer), director–actor 2  0.2 (Har-
low was also a newcomer), actor 1–actor 2  0.2, di-
rector-cinematographer  0 (Wellman had never worked
with Jennings before) and director-editor  0.2 (Well-
man had worked with McDermott on Maybe It’s Love in
1930).
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from the same source. Rankings of stardom are
volatile and are regularly updated, and lists and
information lose value rapidly. For each film, we
gave scores according to whether personnel had
been included in the money-making rankings in the
prior year.
The third status dimension was critics’ recogni-
tion. Like other cultural industries, film production
is characterized by quality uncertainty and over-
supply, two conditions that offer critics a gatekeep-
ing role (Caves, 2000). Critics accumulate special-
ized training, expertise, and knowledge in
particular domains, and their cultural capital legit-
imizes their judgments. Thus, positive selection by
critics produces visibility and confers prestige. For
critics’ recognition, we attributed scores to winners
of the New York Film Critics Circle (NYFCC)
Award, deemed the most influential in the industry
(Levy, 1987). For years prior to the founding of the
award in 1935, we employed data from the promi-
nent Film Daily Critics Poll.
Hierarchical layers. Our measure of organiza-
tional constraint was based on observation of the
production roles attached to films. To represent the
three hierarchical solutions that might be adopted
to coordinate production of a film—the central pro-
ducer, or one-layer, organizational structure; the
unit producer, or two-layer, structure; and the unit
producer with associate, or three-layer, struc-
ture—we created two dichotomous variables. The
first variable took the value 1 if a film was coordi-
nated by a unit producer, and 0 otherwise. The
second variable took the value 1 if the film was
coordinated by a unit producer plus an associate
and 0 otherwise. The central producer structure
was the reference category.
Control variables. Environmental munificence
(the availability of environmental resources) might
have affected the exploratory behavior of Holly-
wood studios (Miller & Shamsie, 1996). To control
for this effect, we included a measure of the aggre-
gate annual industry turnover in deflated dollars in
the year prior to the release of a film. The variable
measuring environmental munificence was named
box office gross.
The institutional regime prevalent in a period
might also affect studio behavior. In 1948 a series of
antitrust decrees issued by the U. S. Supreme Court
imposed separation of exhibition interests from
production and distribution activities on the verti-
cally integrated major film studios. After 1948 the
majors reduced their long-term contractual arrange-
ments with creative talent and relied more on film-
by-film deals. We introduced a dichotomous vari-
able, post-Paramount case, coded 1 for films
produced after 1948, and 0 otherwise, to capture
institutional regime.
Size might also shape studio behavior. Larger
organizations tend to be more bureaucratic and less
flexible in their decisions (Hannan & Freeman,
1984). Although increasing size generally implies
excess resources that can be used for innovation,
resources can become overabundant and damage
performance by diminishing project selection dis-
cipline (Nohria & Gulati, 1996). We measured size
as firm revenues, the total volume of ticket sales
generated by the films released by each firm in the
year prior to the release of a focal film. Data came
from Finler (1988) and company reports.
Large pools of resources might guarantee broad
use and reduce the need to employ new resources.
We measured each studio’s resources, or talent
pool, as the studio’s total number of contracts with
creative and technical personnel (the minimum
contractual duration considered was two years).
The data came from two annual directories, the
Motion Picture Almanac and the Film Daily Year
Book, and from Finler (1988). This measure corre-
lated with firm size at .51 but allowed a more
precise control for resource utilization because we
determined its effect holding size and strategy
constant.
Because accruing experience promotes formal-
ized relationships and standardized routines, firms
with greater experience might show inertia and
keep close to their established competences when
they innovate (Sørensen & Stuart, 2000). Inertia
might have reduced the introduction of newcomers
in the film projects analyzed. The effect on recom-
binations depended on the “stickiness” of back-
ground knowledge vis-a`-vis the assimilation of new
information. Our control variable for firm experi-
ence was the cumulative count of films made by
each firm up until the year prior to the release of a
focal film.
We also controlled for the influence of top man-
agers’ history of product experimentation. Execu-
tives can experiment early in their appointments in
order to learn how to be effective. Later, they be-
come more confident but feel less pressured to
increase their learning (Miller & Shamsie, 2001).
However, as experience grows, executives tend to
become less prone to error and more likely to be
rewarded for their experiments (March, 1991). We
5 We did not rely on accounting data because during
our observation period the film studios engaged in diver-
sified activities and did not separate out the assets or
financial performance of their motion picture businesses
or, specifically, its production sector.
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included first- and second-order terms measuring
of years of studio head tenure to control for time
dependence in product experimentation. Data were
from Finler (1988).
Producer experience was another a control vari-
able. When individuals or organizations lack expe-
rience, their abilities to execute routines and solve
problems are limited (Hannan & Freeman, 1984;
March, 1991). Also, inexperienced producers are
less likely to obtain access to resources or engage in
relations with established counterparts because of
their weak positions in the social structure (Stinch-
combe, 1965). We introduced a dummy variable to
signal when a film was the first to be coordinated
by a producer at any hierarchical level.
Our final control variable captured the effect of
financial resources, because films with higher fi-
nancial resources might use expensive, high-status
inputs, thereby reducing the introduction of new
resources (Caves, 2000). We used a dummy variable
to indicate whether a film was produced using
more costly technologies (color, wide screen, etc.)
as a proxy for high budget.
Analysis
Our dependent variables had outcomes ranked
on scales ranging from 0 to 5 and from 1 to 1,
respectively. We analyzed them as ordinal because
their outcomes could be ranked in categories but
the distance between them was not known, condi-
tions violating the assumptions needed for use of
linear regression models (McKelvey & Zavoina,
1975; Winship & Mare, 1984). Therefore, we em-
ployed polytomous logistic regression—ordered
logit analysis—to examine our data (Long, 1997).
To allow nonindependence within and across clus-
ters of observations, we combined robust estima-
tors of variance with additional correction for the
effects of clustered data grouped on the seven
firms.
RESULTS
Table 1 reports the means, standard deviations,
and correlations among the variables used in the
study. Regression results are presented in Tables 2
and 3. To test coefficients with clustered estima-
tion, Wald tests can be used in place of likelihood-
ratio tests, and adjusted tests are useful when the
total number of clusters is smaller than 100, as it is
in this case of a total of 7 (Korn & Graubard, 1990).
We present the results from adjusted Wald tests to
compare competing specifications jointly with
Akaike’s information criterion (AIC), which can be
employed when likelihood-ratio tests cannot com-
pare nonnested models (Long, 1997). Models with
smaller AIC values are considered better-fitting
specifications.
Results of Regression Analyses
Models 1a and 1b in Tables 2 and 3, respectively,
show how the control variables affect the logarth-
mic odds of the introduction of newcomers and the
6 A Brant test examining the parallel regression as-
sumption revealed that none of the explanatory variables
showed statistical significance at p  .10 or higher, sug-
gesting that the assumption had not been violated (Long,
1997).
TABLE 1
Descriptive Statisticsa
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Newcomers index 0.44 0.71
2. New combinations index 0.13 0.46 .55
3. Status 1.37 1.24 .09 .10
4. Two hierarchical layers 0.75 0.43 .06 .03 .02
5. Three hierarchical layers 0.12 0.32 .03 .02 .02 .54
6. Box office gross 8.90 2.20 .04 .05 .01 .12 .13
7. Post-Paramount case 0.22 0.41 .05 .06 .08 .19 .05 .06
8. Firm revenues 7.44 4.06 .05 .02 .12 .07 .10 .12 .07
9. Talent pool 65.57 25.01 .11 .07 .08 .05 .04 .21 .14 .51
10. Firm experience 9.84 4.74 .03 .00 .11 .15 .06 .30 .37 .23 .29
11. Studio head tenure 7.08 6.68 .03 .02 .01 .14 .02 .23 .24 .17 .18 .14
12. Producer experience 0.07 0.26 .09 .10 .01 .05 .04 .06 .08 .00 .02 .04 .05
13. Film budget 0.06 0.24 .04 .02 .02 .01 .05 .18 .11 .09 .09 .06 .05 .01
a n  6,446. Coefficients of .06 and above are significant at p  .05.
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recombination of team members. We found a cur-
vilinear effect of studio head tenure, indicating
higher exploration in later years. In keeping with
this result, producers on their first films tended to
exploit previously employed personnel. A larger
resource base reduced the need to introduce new
personnel into the production teams. In model 1a,
higher budgets traded new resources for more ex-
pensive established ones. Other variables control-
ling for inertia in organizational action showed
only limited or nonsignificant effects. We did not
find that the Paramount decrees affected design in
production teams in a significant way.
In the next step, with models 2a and 2b we esti-
mated a linear effect for personnel status, and with
models 3a and 3b we added the quadratic term. In
general, the higher the composite status, the less
likely it was that newcomers would enter produc-
tion teams or that old-timers would be mixed in
new combinations. As actors and directors gained
status, they seemed less willing to jettison the ben-
efits associated with their positions. However,
high-status personnel, for whom recognition from
multiple audiences increased their role security,
enjoyed greater freedom and seemed to foster ex-
ploration. Results from the Wald tests and the AIC
revealed fit better relative to the baseline. We found
strong support for our first hypothesis.
Models 4a and 4b tested our second hypothesis
by including the two producer dummies. Tables 2
and 3 show signs and statistical significance con-
sistent with our prediction: Although coordination
by a unit producer decreased the likelihood of en-
try for newcomers and limited new combinations,
the presence of associates had a positive effect. The
unit producer system might have had high effi-
ciency, but we found evidence that it did not foster
exploration. The Wald tests and the information
criterion indicated improving fit of the models,
supporting the second hypothesis.
Models 5a and 5b, our full models, included the
status and hierarchical layers variables. The direc-
TABLE 3
Results of Ordered-Logit Regression Analyses for the New Combinations Indexa
Variables Model 1b Model 2b Model 3b Model 4b Model 5b
Status 0.15*** (0.04) 0.30*** (0.06) 0.30*** (0.05)
Status squared 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Two hierarchical layers 0.41*** (0.10) 0.39*** (0.10)
Three hierarchical layers 0.16** (0.06) 0.14* (0.06)
Box office gross 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.02 (0.03) 0.00 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Post-Paramount case 0.20 (0.14) 0.23† (0.13) 0.25† (0.14) 0.23† (0.14) 0.24* (0.13)
Firm revenues 0.03† (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.03* (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.03
†
(0.02)
Firm experience 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Talent pool 0.01* (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 0.01† (0.00)
Executive tenure 0.06** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.05** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.06*** (0.02)
Executive tenure squared 0.01* (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Producer experience 0.64*** (0.01) 0.64*** (0.10) 0.64*** (0.10) 0.68*** (0.09) 0.69*** (0.09)
Budget 0.10 (0.11) 0.10 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.11 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11)
Threshold parameter estimates
1 3.71 (0.34) 3.89 (0.33) 4.05 (0.34) 3.89 (0.33) 4.22 (0.33)
2 2.85 (0.30) 3.03 (0.29) 3.18 (0.29) 3.03 (0.29) 3.35 (0.28)
3 1.91 (0.30) 2.08 (0.28) 2.24 (0.28) 2.08 (0.28) 2.40 (0.27)
4 1.10 (0.31) 1.27 (0.28) 1.42 (0.28) 1.27 (0.29) 1.58 (0.27)
5 0.26 (0.30) 0.41 (0.28) 0.56 (0.27) 0.42 (0.29) 0.72 (0.27)
6 0.63 (0.31) 0.48 (0.28) 0.33 (0.28) 0.46 (0.30) 0.17 (0.28)
7 1.12 (0.31) 0.97 (0.28) 0.82 (0.28) 0.96 (0.29) 0.67 (0.27)
8 1.74 (0.30) 1.59 (0.27) 1.44 (0.27) 1.58 (0.29) 1.29 (0.26)
9 2.09 (0.30) 1.94 (0.27) 1.79 (0.27) 1.93 (0.29) 1.64 (0.26)
10 2.99 (0.33) 2.84 (0.29) 2.70 (0.29) 2.83 (0.32) 2.54 (0.29)
Log pseudo-likelihood 13,925.77 13,891.66 13,875.81 13,907.73 13,858.41
Wald test (prob.  2) 12.56 (1)*** 30.00 (2)*** 17.25 (2)*** 204.73 (4)***
AIC 4.327 4.316 4.312 4.322 4.307
a n  6,446. Robust standard errors corrected for the effects of clustered data are in parentheses.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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tion of the coefficients and the statistical signifi-
cance replicated the findings obtained in the inter-
mediate specification. The Wald test and the AIC
also indicated that the full models offer the best-
fitting specifications. Our hypotheses were strongly
supported.
For a finer-grained interpretation of our results,
we used odds ratios, particularly percent changes
in the odds for unit or standard deviation increases
in the dependent variables. Percent changes are
calculated by subtracting the odds ratio from 1 and
multiplying the difference by 100. For instance, in
model 5a the odds of observing higher exploration
values for new team members were .38 times
smaller when a unit producer supervised a film and
.12 times larger when an associate was involved in
the project, and all other variables were constant.
The odds of having values that are less positive for
exploration via use of new team members were .40
times smaller with a one-standard-deviation in-
crease in the composite status index. The odds
became .26 times larger for the quadratic term of
the status index. Finally, we examined the pre-
dicted probabilities of observing individual values
in our dependent variables within the observed
range. For instance, for regular-budget films made
in 1929–48 involving a unit producer who had
previous experience in filmmaking, the probability
of observing the entry of three newcomers into a
team is 0.16 when the status index is 3, 0.02 when
the index is 12, and 0.05 when the index reaches its
maximum of 27.
So far we have focused on the aggregate effects of
status on team composition. The structure of our
index allowed us to explore whether particular
types of personnel had more impact than others on
team composition. Models 6a and 6b, reported in
Table 3, separately tested the effects of director
status and actor status. The U-shaped relationships
for status continue to hold at the individual level.
However, we found interesting differences in the
impact of status on exploration. High-status actors
generated stronger, negative effects on exploration
than directors. In model 6a a one-unit increase in
actor status decreased the change in odds by 78.3
percent, while a similar increase in director status
decreased the odds by 55 percent. Actors enjoy
greater visibility with audiences than directors, and
this advantageous position appeared to allow them
to exert more power in team composition.
Robustness Checks
We tested the findings’ robustness in three ways.
First, we considered alternative models of estima-
tion, including (1) the generalized ordered logit
model, in which the regression coefficients could
vary across the different equations; (2) the contin-
uation ratio, in which the categories for the ordinal
outcomes were an interdependent progression of
events; (3) negative binomial regressions, in which
the new combinations index was rescaled to posi-
tive integers from 0 to 10; and (4) cross-sectional
time series regressions, with firm, year, or film
genre used as the grouping unit. Second, we mod-
ified the time windows for the status effects, apply-
ing a one-year or an indefinite duration to all three
measures. Neither exercise affected the results.
Third, we addressed some of the methodological
issues confronting our analysis arising from the
specific construction of our variables, particularly
the dyads and status. Table 5 presents a reestima-
tion of the full models under three cases. First, we
examined the effects of triads. Our main analysis
measured dyads as powerful representations of in-
teraction and interdependence, and the simplest
form of social interaction embedding the basic fea-
tures of more articulate interaction. However, other
forms, such as triads, incorporate additional func-
tions absent in dyads, such as intermediation,
which can introduce asymmetry (Krackhardt,
1999). Model 7 presents the results from a regres-
sion analysis with triadic combinations as the de-
pendent variable, with ranges varying between 2
and 2. Even accounting for potential asymmetry in
team interaction, our main results continue to hold.
Second, in our principal analysis, the composite
index of status took a multiplicative form to reflect
the interdependence of the film production process
and the comparative advantage accruing to high-
status personnel. But such advantage may increase
additively rather than multiplicatively. Thus, in
models 8 and 9 we estimated the full models with
the status index calculated as the sum of individual
status within the team. Our main findings re-
mained unaffected. Third, as shown in the final
model presented in Table 5, we combined the pre-
vious two checks to estimate model 10, and the
results were again unaffected.
7 As our models were not linear, the magnitude of
change in the outcome probability for a given change in
one of the independent variable depended on the levels
of all of the independent variables.
8 Individual probabilities were calculated from the full
model by first evaluating covariate effects, then subtract-
ing these effects from the appropriate threshold, and
finally transforming the results into individual
probabilities.
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DISCUSSION
Contributions to Theory
Our findings support the contention that status
differentiation of teammembers and organization-
al hierarchies affect the exploration/exploitation
trade-off in team composition. We see several
contributions emerging from this study. First, we
extend research on organizational search and the
balance between exploration and exploitation.
Whereas previous research has focused on organ-
izational processes such as product innovation or
market entry, we identify a new dimension, team
design, in which organizational actors pursue
their search for novel solutions vis-à-vis the exe-
cution of available alternatives. Moreover, teams
represent a micro-organizational setting consis-
tent with March’s (1991) treatment of the trade-
off between exploration and exploitation. How-
ever, whereas the original formulation of the
theory focused on the different responses that
newcomers and old-timers offer to organizations,
we illustrate two antecedent mechanisms that
limit the extent to which the two groups can be
combined. Also, although previous studies on
search processes (Fleming, 2001) have empha-
sized that there are no limits on the scope of
potential recombination of components, our re-
sults instead indicate that restrictions do exist
and not all combinations are possible.
The second contribution of this study is to the
team literature. McGrath and colleagues (2000)
encouraged studies on teams that would address
relationships both at the team level and at the
level of the boundaries between teams and their
embedding systems. In this study, we analyzed
team design as the outcome of both an informal
process based on status differentiation at the
team level, and a formal process based on differ-
ent hierarchical structures at the organizational
level. Moreover, although extant research has
treated team composition as an exogenous vari-
able (Williams & O’Reilly, 1998), we show that
critical endogenous processes affect team compo-
sition. Reagans and coauthors (2004) challenged
the use of demographic criteria in relation to the
intrinsic limits placed on a manager’s ability to
shape the composition of a team. Our study sug-
gests that a manager’s degree of freedom in team
composition can be constrained not only by fixed
attributes linked to the demographic make-up of
an organization, but also by variable attributes
like organizational hierarchies and team member
status. The U-shaped relationships found in this
study show that such limits change endog-
enously, expanding or contracting managerial
discretion.
Third, we extend the theory on social status by
considering and measuring multiple evaluation
processes by external audiences (Phillips & Zuck-
erman, 2001). To our knowledge, this is the first
study that investigates status as a multidimensional
construct. Previous research has focused on the
interaction of single audiences with social actors,
but we argue that different audiences simulta-
neously evalute individuals and organizations that
operate in the same market and that although such
evaluations are distinct, the social rankings they
develop are interrelated. Our findings also indicate
that middle-status conformity may be a very gen-
eral mechanism that goes unnoticed when status is
TABLE 4
Results of Ordered-Logit Regression Analyses for
the Newcomers and New Combinations Index,
Individual Effectsa
Variable Model 6a Model 6b
Director status 0.80** (0.27) 1.55** (0.58)
Director status squared 0.15** (0.06) 0.37** (0.13)
Actor 1 status 1.53** (0.54) 0.96*** (0.26)
Actor 1 status squared 0.29* (0.13) 0.18** (0.06)
Actor 2 status 1.63* (0.68) 2.31* (0.92)
Actor 2 status squared 0.27 (0.22) 0.50* (0.21)
Two hierarchical layers 0.48*** (0.08) 0.41*** (0.10)
Three hierarchical layers 0.17** (0.06) 0.15* (0.06)
Box office gross 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03)
Post-Paramount case 0.14 (0.15) 0.27* (0.14)
Firm revenues 0.04† (0.02) 0.03† (0.02)
Firm experience 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.01)
Talent pool 0.01* (0.00) 0.01† (0.00)
Executive tenure 0.06* (0.04) 0.06*** (0.02)
Executive tenure squared 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00)
Producer experience 0.56*** (0.08) 0.68*** (0.09)
Budget 0.23*** (0.04) 0.12 (0.10)
Threshold parameter
estimates
1 3.48 (0.47) 7.72 (0.78)
2 1.68 (0.44) 6.85 (0.74)
3 0.13 (0.47) 5.90 (0.73)
4 1.38 (0.48) 5.80 (0.70)
5 3.29 (0.78) 4.22 (0.71)
6 3.32 (0.72)
7 2.82 (0.71)
8 2.20 (0.72)
9 1.85 (0.71)
10 0.95 (0.72)
Log pseudo-likelihood 5,511.88 13,844.60
AIC 1.717 4.304
a n  6,446. Robust standard errors corrected for the effects of
clustered data are in parentheses.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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analyzed through the lens of a single audience.
This insight suggests that future studies should ac-
count for the judgment of different audiences when
assessing the impact of social status on individual
or organizational outcomes.
Fourth, our study provides empirical ground for
simulation studies that investigate how organiza-
tional structures moderate the balance between ex-
ploration and exploitation (Rivkin & Siggelkow,
2005; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). Siggelkow and
Levinthal (2003) compared structures in which
each subunit made its own decisions to structures
in which decisions were made only at the firm
level. The first type of structure supports parallel
search but suffers from lack of coordination. The
second allows weighing interactions that local
managers may ignore but suffers from low explora-
tion. The authors’ findings suggest ignoring inter-
dependencies for an initial phase so that each team
is given “free reign and exhorted to find the best
solution for its own sub-problem” (Siggelkow &
Levinthal, 2003: 665). The suggestion that wider
freedom for low-level managers will increase ex-
ploration has also been expressed in the general
management literature (Hamel, 2000). Our results
point to a different and counterintuitive implica-
tion: when unleashed, project managers may face a
riskier set of options. A higher degree of autonomy
may increase managers’ constraints and decrease
their freedom to explore new solutions. In fact, a
recently estimated simulation model has shown
that restrictions on managerial freedom at lower
levels might actually broaden exploration (Rivkin &
Siggelkow, 2005). Our study provides theoretical
justification and empirical evidence consistent
with such a model.
TABLE 5
Robustness Testsa
Variables
Model 7: New
Combinations
Index, Triadic
Combinations
Model 8:
Newcomers Index,
Additive Status
Model 9: New
Combinations
Index, Additive
Status
Model 10: New
Combinations
Index, Triad
Combinations and
Additive Status
Status 0.27*** (0.04) 0.93*** (0.21) 0.81* (0.34) 0.67** (0.23)
Status squared 0.01*** (0.00) 0.05** (0.02) 0.06** (0.02) 0.04* (0.02)
Two hierarchical layers 0.43*** (0.11) 0.48*** (0.08) 0.40*** (0.10) 0.43*** (0.11)
Three hierarchical layers 0.19** (0.07) 0.18** (0.06) 0.15* (0.06) 0.19** (0.06)
Box office gross 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 0.01 (0.03)
Post-Paramount case 0.20 (0.13) 0.14 (0.15) 0.29* (0.13) 0.21 (0.13)
Firm revenues 0.04† (0.02) 0.04† (0.02) 0.03† (0.02) 0.04† (0.02)
Firm experience 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01) 0.01 (0.01)
Talent pool 0.01 (0.00) 0.01* (0.00) 0.01† (0.00) 0.01 (0.00)
Executive tenure 0.04† (0.02) 0.06* (0.04) 0.06*** (0.02) 0.04† (0.02)
Executive tenure squared 0.01* (0.00) 0.01** (0.00) 0.01*** (0.00) 0.01** (0.00)
Producer experience 0.65*** (0.09) 0.54*** (0.08) 0.69*** (0.09) 0.65*** (0.09)
Budget 0.13 (0.11) 0.22*** (0.05) 0.12 (0.11) 0.12 (0.11)
Threshold parameter estimates
1 4.75 (0.48) 2.04 (0.54) 5.84 (0.79) 6.12 (0.66)
2 2.64 (0.34) 0.23 (0.51) 4.98 (0.75) 4.01 (0.51)
3 0.06 (0.33) 1.31 (0.48) 4.03 (0.72) 1.42 (0.44)
4 1.40 (0.30) 2.82 (0.52) 3.21 (0.67) 0.04 (0.40)
5 4.73 (0.90) 2.35 (0.68)
6 1.46 (0.68)
7 0.96 (0.67)
8 0.34 (0.67)
9 0.01 (0.66)
10 0.92 (0.66)
Log pseudo-likelihood 7,856.48 5,517.69 13,858.46 7,855.00
AIC 2.443 1.718 4.307 2.442
a n  6,446. Robust standard errors corrected for the effects of clustered data are in parentheses.
† p  .10
* p  .05
** p  .01
*** p  .001
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Implications for Management Practice
Team composition requires choosing particular
options from a set of possible choices, and manag-
ers need to minimize the risk of making the
“wrong” choices in team configuration. Our find-
ings have two implications for action. First, high
status signals the potential value of team members,
and it drives solutions to combine members at re-
duced risk. However, status may constrain choices
of other members. By ignoring status differentiation
between members, team designers may generate
two harmful consequences, destroying resources
that are valuable for both projects and organization
and triggering power conflicts in the team design or
execution process. As a consequence, managers
need to collect more information about external
audiences and the social rankings they develop;
however, multiple sources and regular information
update make monitoring status a challenging task.
Thus, the trade-off between exploration and exploi-
tation is accompanied by a trade-off between infor-
mation cost and negotiation over power
controversies.
Second, managers cannot simply insert teams
into an existing organization without being pre-
pared to alter its structure (Hackman, 2002). Exclu-
sive reliance on unit or top managers dampens
coordination or exploration. Middle managers offer
several advantages because they are closer to day-
to-day operations and frontline managers. They can
develop novel solutions because their repertoires of
action are more diverse than top managers’, and
they can incorporate connections, function as com-
municators, and synchronize the tempo of organi-
zational change (Huy, 2001).
Limitations and Future Research
Despite the support for the hypotheses that
emerged, the present study has several limitations,
and these suggest directions for future research.
First, we relied on a selective analysis of personnel
to evaluate the determinants of explorative design.
The inclusion of a broader range of resources in-
volved in film production could provide a more
comprehensive picture of the role played by social
status and coordination. Also, our study did not
investigate the effect of individual characteristics
on explorative decisions. Future research could
compare the impacts of status and hierarchy with
those of established measures of team diversity
such as age, gender, and ethnicity. Second, we lim-
ited our study to a set of large organizations within
one industry. It would be important to extend our
analysis to smaller producers, not only to avoid
size bias, but also to determine the consistency of
the patterns we observed. Third, although we were
able to assess the mix of exploration and exploita-
tion at the team level, we did not analyze team or
firm performance. Future research could attempt to
specify what team composition is best for superior
performance and how performance induces feed-
back on team design and structural determinants of
exploration and exploitation. Fourth, despite the
controls we introduced, we did not directly ac-
count for the strength of past team combinations. In
this context, it would be relevant to address the
relationships between individual experience, expe-
rience of collaboration, and team composition.
Finally, we must caution against overgeneraliza-
tion of the findings. We believe our arguments are
valid for industries: (1) organized around sequen-
tial team production, (2) characterized by demand
uncertainty, and (3) influenced by judgments and
rankings formulated by multiple external audi-
ences on outputs and inputs. Relaxing one or more
of these conditions will require theoretical refine-
ments and new empirical validation. Overall, these
limitations provide intriguing puzzles for future
work and for further exploration of this complex
area of study.
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